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Global energy governance: a review
and research agenda
Thijs Van de Graaf1 and Jeff Colgan2
ABSTRACT Over the past few years, global energy governance (GEG) has emerged as a
major new ﬁeld of enquiry in international studies. Scholars engaged in this ﬁeld seek to
understand how the energy sector is governed at the global level, by whom and with what
consequences. By focusing on governance, they broaden and enrich the geopolitical and
hard-nosed security perspectives that have long been, and still are, the dominant perspec-
tives through which energy is analysed. Though still a nascent ﬁeld, the literature on GEG is
thriving and continues to attract the attention of a growing number of researchers. This
article reviews the GEG literature as it has developed over the past 10 years. Our aim is to
highlight both the progress and limitations of the ﬁeld, and to identify some opportunities
for future research. The article proceeds as follows. First, it traces the origins of the GEG
literature (section “Origins and roots of GEG research”). The subsequent sections deal with
the two topics that have received the most attention in the GEG literature: Why does energy
need global governance (section “The goals and rationale of global energy governance”)?
And, who governs energy (section “Mapping the global energy architecture”)? We then
address a third question that has received far less attention: How well or poor is energy
governed (section “Evaluating global energy governance”)? In our conclusions (section
“Conclusions and outlook”), we reﬂect on the current state of GEG, review recent trends and
innovations, and identify some questions that warrant future consideration by scholars. This
article is published as part of a thematic collection on global governance.
Origins and roots of global energy governance (GEG) research
The term “GEG” emerged in about the same period as the G8 picked up the theme at itsGleneagles summit in 2005. Two drivers led both the G8 and academic scholars to turntheir attention to energy: growing concern over energy security in the wake of steadily
rising oil prices and the ﬁrst Russia–Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2006, and growing concern
over climate change. Not surprisingly, one of the ﬁrst academics to actually use the term “GEG”
was a G8-expert, Kirton (2006), and one of the ﬁrst topics to be scrutinized by academics was
precisely the G8’s work on energy (Lesage et al., 2009).
Two research programmes further propelled research in this area. The ﬁrst was a research
project entitled “Changing Rules of the Game: Global Energy Governance in the 21st Century”,
which ran from January 2008 to December 2009 at the Global Public Policy Institute, an
independent think tank based in Berlin. The project’s objective was to examine the rules
governing three areas of global oil and gas governance: ﬁnancial markets, trade and investment
agreements, and supply (risk) management.1 The main output of the project was an edited
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volume entitled “Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of
the Game”, which was published by the Brookings Institution
Press in January 2010 (Goldthau and Witte, 2010).
The second research programme was the Study Group on
Global Energy Governance, convened by Ann Florini and
Navroz Dubash. This study group was part of the 3-year S.T. Lee
Project on Global Governance, organized by the Lee Kuan Yew
School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore
(NUS).2 The project’s goal was to examine the institutions
that directly and indirectly govern energy, and the interactions
across, and gaps between, those institutions. But the study group
also payed particular attention to the implications for energy
governance of the rise of Asia in world politics. The group
convened twice at NUS, once in October 2009 and again in May
in 2010. The work of the study group resulted in the publication
of a special issue of Global Policy in September 2011 (Florini and
Dubash, 2011).
Early writings approached the subject of GEG from two entry
points. One entry point, mostly espoused by energy security
specialists, was to criticize the “lopsided attention to the geo-
political dimension of energy security”, which is allegedly based
on the “myopic and erroneous presumption that global energy
politics is necessarily a zero-sum game in which one country’s
energy security is another’s lack thereof” (Goldthau and Witte,
2009: 373). Adopting a lense of global governance brings to the
fore a critical set of actors and structures that geopolitics neglects,
most notably markets and institutions (the latter referred to as the
“rules of the game”). Another entry point, mostly adopted by
global governance specialists, asked “why this policy ﬁeld—closely
related to such policy ﬁelds as trade, environment, and climate,
where multilateral global governance efforts are concentrated—is
scarcely governed cooperatively, despite the growing necessity for
multilateral governance” (Westphal, 2006: 44; see also Lesage
et al., 2010a).
Needless to say, scholars had been studying international
energy cooperation well before 2005, just not under the rubric of
“GEG”. Some of these studies are well known, such as Keohane’s
(1984) treatment of the oil consumers’ regime in his seminal
work After Hegemony. Others are less well known, judging by
the paucity of citations to these works, but certainly no less
interesting. They include Kohl’s (1983) work on international
institutions for energy management; Cowhey’s (1985) work on
how nation-states, international organizations and multinational
corporations have coordinated their actions to manage the energy
market; and Kapstein’s (1990) analysis of Western alliance
relations during the major energy crises after World War II up
until the 1980s.
This list, far from exhaustive, merely serves to drive home
the point that energy cooperation has received some attention in
the literature but has not given way to an integrated research
programme. Research on energy, especially its international
dimensions, has largely been “descriptive, atheoretical and
noncumulative” (Wilson, 1987). In a recent survey of the
literature, Hughes and Lipscy (2013) came to the conclusion
that “many of the important questions in the politics of energy
remain unanswered or are only beginning to be addressed”. It is
illustrative, for example, to note how energy has been overlooked
within the large research programme on international regimes.
Krasner’s (1983) seminal volume on International Regimes
does not feature a chapter or case study on energy. While some
authors have applied the regime concept to the policy ﬁeld of oil
(Keohane, 1984; Maswood, 1990), others have argued that an
international regime has never existed in the history of the
petroleum industry. Bull-Berg (1985), for example, argues that the
postwar international energy system could at best be described as
an “imposed order”.
There are four basic explanations for the under-theorization of
energy (Van de Graaf et al., 2016). First, many of the acknowl-
edged energy experts are not particularly worried about theory.
Rather, their concern lies with the short-run prospects for the
market and with the question of how governments, corporations
and other actors should respond (Strange, 1994). Second, there
are high barriers to entry to a ﬁeld such as energy that requires a
dose of technical understanding. Third, the multifaceted nature of
energy as a policy area—straddling political science, economics
and a host of other social sciences—makes it defy unidisciplinary
analysis. Finally, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a relative cut in
social science funding for energy research since the “heyday” of
the 1970s (Lutzenhiser and Shove, 1999).
The goals and rationale of GEG
Today’s energy transitions. After two decades of relative neglect,
political scientists and international relations scholars have redis-
covered energy as a worthy research topic (Hughes and Lipscy,
2013). One reason for the renewed interest is the set of dramatic
transitions that are currently underway in the global energy
market. Here we discuss three central trends and transformations:
climate change, geopolitical change, and increasing volatility in
oil and gas markets.3 It is these transitions that have prompted
scholars to examine energy from a global governance perspec-
tive, and as these transitions continue to evolve, their impact
on the institutional architecture of GEG will require further
investigation.
Arguably the most important transition is linked to the issue
of global climate change and the need to decarbonize the global
economy. Energy production and consumption is the single
largest source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, representing
almost 70% of global emissions (International Energy Agency
(IEA), 2014: 7). States and markets have been slow to change, and
world carbon emissions continue to rise. Still, to the extent that
states take meaningful action to reduce GHG emissions, this is
very likely to create incentives for a signiﬁcant change in fuel
choices and energy production patterns. Incentives will shift away
from consumption based on heavily emitting sources, such as coal
and petroleum, towards low-emitting sources, such as wind, solar,
geothermal and hydroelectric power. New governance structures
and networks will be necessary to create the incentives for
such a shift and to manage the consequences of it. With the
emergence of institutions like the International Renewable Energy
Agency (IRENA) and the Renewable Energy and Energy
Efﬁciency Partnership (REEEP), the ﬁrst stages of this institu-
tional development are already under way. In the run-up to the
climate conference in Paris in late 2015, for the ﬁrst time ever,
almost all of the world’s countries have committed to reducing or
controlling their own GHG emissions.
A second major transition comes from geopolitical change.
The two most signiﬁcant changes are the collapse of the Soviet
Union in the early 1990s and the more recent rise of developing
countries as energy importers. Non-Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have seen their
share in worldwide energy demand rise from less than 30% in
1970 to almost 60% in 2014 (BP, 2015; see also Fig. 1). Some of
the world’s biggest energy importers (for example, China, India)
are outside of any meaningful institutional apparatus for energy
governance. This has vast consequences: the IEA’s ability to
manage oil supply crises is largely dependent on its ability to
affect world oil markets through releases from the IEA member’s
strategic reserves. In the 1970s, all of the major oil importing
countries were members of the OECD; today, rapidly developing
countries have changed the landscape. For instance, in 1995
China was importing roughly 400,000 barrels of crude oil per day;
REVIEW ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2015.47
2 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 2:15047 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2015.47 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms
in 2014, it was importing 6.2 million barrels per day—more than
France and Italy combined (BP, 2015). With major oil customers
operating outside of the IEA framework, the organization’s
members could be left with signiﬁcantly less control over the oil
market in the event of a crisis. Consequently, the IEA has been
urged to expand its membership to include China and India, but
there are signiﬁcant obstacles to such an expansion (Colgan,
2009; Van de Graaf, 2015).
A third major transition is the increasing volatility on oil and
gas markets, even in the absence of changes linked to climate
change. Oil prices have swung markedly over the past few years.
The period 2005–2014 witnessed a cycle of high (and volatile)
energy prices, after a long cycle of low prices in the period 1985–
2005 (see Fig. 2). High oil prices in the 2000s spawned an active
debate about “peak oil” and the amount of oil geologically
available on the planet. The revolution in shale gas and tight oil
production in North America has largely stymied this debate.
There are opposing views of the current situation. Some
observers, such as Rex Tillerson (2013), the chairman and CEO
of ExxonMobil, avow that “we are now witnessing the transition
to a new Era of Abundance”. Others, such as Klare (2009), see the
fracking revolution as a sign that we are entering the “Era of
Extreme Energy”. In Klare’s view, shale gas, tight oil, the Arctic
race and tar sands are all symptoms showing it is getting harder
and more expensive to ﬁnd new oil deposits. Tillerson and Klare
both raise points with some validity, but regardless, it is already
clear that the cheapest oil reserves are increasingly being
produced from autocratic and sometimes politically unstable
regions of the world. Since oil is traded on a globally integrated
market, developments anywhere could provoke ripple effects
throughout the world market. In that regard it is notable that
the nature of threats to energy security has changed over time.
In the 1970s, Arab nationalism and tight oil market conditions
combined to make oil embargos from Organization of the
Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) the dominant energy
supply concern for energy-importing countries. In 2015, the
nature of the threats has changed considerably. The role of non-
state actors has increased, in the form of piracy off the coast of
Somalia, “bunkering” (that is, theft and smuggling) in Nigeria,
and terrorism in Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq.
Scope and objectives of GEG. These trends and transformations
highlight—and in some cases exacerbate—a host of externalities
associated with our global energy system. These externalities
include the possibility of national and international energy
shortages, nuclear proliferation and global climate change.
Market price signals alone are often insufﬁcient to provide
satisfactory outcomes, creating a rationale for some form of
governance to deal with those externalities (Meyer, 2012; Van de
Graaf, 2013b). The concept of governance became widely used in
development policy circles in the 1980s and, from there, also
spread to other social science disciplines, including political sci-
ence, law, public administration, economics, sociology, geography
and history (Rhodes, 1996). The emergence and rapid spread of
the term is linked to processes of neo-liberalism and globaliza-
tion, which denotes the global shift from the 1970s onwards to
ﬁnancial deregulation, trade liberalization and the consolidation
of global production networks (Scholte, 2005). These shifts are
said to have eroded the capacity of traditional modes of state-
based regulation to steer society, both domestically and inter-
nationally (Strange, 1996). Other scholars, however, have docu-
mented that the “shift” towards non-state forms of governance is
often exaggerated and that such forms actually have a long history
(Green and Colgan, 2013).
Although the “retreat of the state” is probably overstated in
many narratives of globalization, there is plentiful evidence that
non-state actors have come to play a more important role in
issues of public policy. Where governance was once assumed to
be synonymous with the activities of government, today it is
understood to also encompass the activities of local and inter-
national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and activist
groups, and the decisions crafted in corporate boardrooms and at
global conferences. The key difference between “government” and
“governance” is of course that the former exercises formal
authority, backed by strong enforcement mechanisms, whereas
the latter refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or
may not rely on formal authority and coercive power (Rosenau
and Czempiel, 1992).
Against this background, a number of scholars have set out to
examine the scope and rationale of GEG. Florini and Sovacool
(2009: 5239) deﬁne GEG as the “international collective efforts
undertaken to manage and distribute energy resources and provide
energy services”. Yet, the scope of GEG is not well deﬁned. The
potential scope of GEG is any social, political or economic issue that
(1) crosses international borders and (2) is tightly connected to the
production, distribution or consumption of energy. The actual scope
is the set of issues to which attention is actively being paid by a set
of relevant actors, including states and/or existing international
organizations. Understanding the gap between the potential and
actual scope of GEG is crucial for understanding how the existing
set of energy institutions might evolve in the future. For policy-
makers, the gaps between potential and actual institutions highlight
the leverage points where effective change might be made.
The potential scope of GEG contains at least ﬁve major objec-
tives (Dubash and Florini, 2011; Goldthau, 2013), as depicted
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Figure 1 | OECD and non-OECD primary energy consumption, 1970–2014
(1970= 100).
Source: BP (2015).
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Figure 2 | Oil price, 1987–2015 (dollars per barrel, Europe Brent Spot
Price FOB).
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration: http://www.eia.gov.
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in Table 1. These objectives are pursued, to varying degrees,
by international organizations in conjunction with state and non-
state actors.
These objectives form a part of GEG because they are asso-
ciated with transboundary issues in one of three ways (Florini and
Sovacool, 2009; Lesage et al., 2010a; Van de Graaf, 2013b;
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2015). First, some objectives, like mana-
ging global climate change or nuclear terrorism, clearly relate to
the cross-border externalities of energy production and use. They
exhibit global public goods characteristics and hence require
action beyond the national level to avoid the collective action
dilemmas associated with such goods (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen
et al., 2012). Second, other objectives, such as protecting human
rights or reducing energy poverty, principally relate to individuals
within national borders, but elicit concern and problem-solving
(or problem-causing) action from international sources (Ghosh
and Ganesan, 2015). Third, some objectives are international
because states use international institutions to learn from, and/or
cajole, each other to make changes to their domestic governance.
Thus domestic good governance ﬁts in the scope of GEG to the
extent that actors seek to use international energy institutions to
“reach in” to areas of traditional sovereignty, typically in non-
coercive ways such as best-practice sharing and information
dissemination.
One branch of the GEG literature conceptualizes the key
energy challenges such as externalities (climate change), trans-
parency issues (oil price volatility) or market asymmetries (for
example, National Oil Companies) in terms of global market
failure. This creates a need, not for global governance as deﬁned
above, but more speciﬁcally for global (public) policy—thus
embedding the whole debate in a growing academic conversation
on “global policy” in sectors as diverse as trade, health, climate or
technology (Goldthau, 2013).
In spite of the global beneﬁts to be reaped from international
cooperation, states have traditionally regarded the energy sector
as a crucial component of national sovereignty. This means that,
in effect, national energy governance still reigns above regional or
GEG. Even in the European Union (EU), by far the world’s most
advanced experiment with regional integration, the member
states have vigilantly guarded their sovereign prerogatives with
regard to energy policy. The result is what McGowan (2009: 21)
has called a “paradox of sovereignty”, whereby states have less
control over energy policy—due to the globalization of energy
markets and related externalities—but remain largely unwilling to
act jointly.
Mapping the global energy architecture
A key strand in the literature has been, and still is, concerned with
mapping the global energy architecture. As ElBaradei (2008),
former director-general of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), observed in 2008: “We have a World Health
Organisation, two global food agencies, the Bretton Woods
ﬁnancial institutions and organisations to deal with everything
from trade to civil aviation and maritime affairs. Energy,
the motor of development and economic growth, is a glaring
exception”. Starting from this observation, a large number of
scholars have addressed the question: “who governs energy?”
(Florini and Sovacool, 2009).4 This is no easy question to answer.
Various mapping exercises have ensued and they have all come
up with a different set of institutional arrangements.
Box 1 offers a summary of the results of eight different efforts
to map GEG arrangements and institutions. The results are
strikingly different. The number of “global energy governors”
identiﬁed ranges from 6 (Kérébel and Keppler, 2009) to 50 (Sovacool
and Florini, 2012). Such mapping exercises of course depend very
much on how wide the net is cast. Some of these studies focus
exclusively on oil and gas markets (Kérébel and Keppler, 2009),
others on renewable energy sources and low-carbon technologies
(Suding and Lempp, 2007; see also Barnsley and Ahn, 2014;
Roehrkasten, 2015). Some focus exclusively on intergovernmental
organizations and summit processes (for example, Colgan et al.,
2012; Wilson, 2015), others also include international NGOs,
multilateral ﬁnancial institutions and hybrid entities, involving
everything from transnational networks of advocacy to quasi-
regulatory private bodies, global policy networks and public–
private partnerships (Sovacool and Florini, 2012).
Table 1 | Key goals of GEG and ways to achieve them
Goal Associated activities
1. Security of energy supply and
demand
 Managing petroleum reserves to buffer energy shocks (for example, coordinating releases from the IEA member states’
strategic petroleum reserves)
 Energy market information sharing (for example, Joint Organizations Data Initiative) and analysis (for example, World
Energy Outlook)
 Addressing pipeline politics and transit route disputes (for example, Russia–Ukraine gas disputes)
 Managing long-term investment issues
2. Economic development  Reducing energy poverty (for example, rural electriﬁcation programmes)
 Facilitating technology transfer and cooperation (for example, energy efﬁciency programmes, nuclear technology
sharing)
 Managing long-term investment proﬁtability and macroeconomic stability
3. International security  Reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism and civilian nuclear accidents
 Addressing the links between oil, international arms purchases and warfare
 Addressing sea piracy that targets oil and natural gas tankers
 Reducing and mitigating terrorist attacks on pipelines and energy infrastructure (including cyberattacks)
4. Environmental sustainability  Facilitating cooperation on global climate change
 Developing renewable energy sources, markets and regulations
 Managing national and regional pollution deriving from energy production
 Facilitating carbon pricing policies
5. Domestic good governance  Addressing human rights violations associated with extractive industries
 Helping governments adopt rational, best-practices in regulation
 Encouraging transparency in energy markets and governance
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A group of scholars has started to conceptualize this patchwork
of institutions as a single organism, a “regime complex”, and
have assessed how it has behaved over time (Colgan et al., 2012;
Baccini et al., 2013; Van de Graaf, 2013b), thus moving from
static to dynamic snapshots of the global energy architecture.
The concept of a “regime complex” was coined by Raustiala and
Victor (2004) to refer to the “array of partially overlapping and
non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area”.
The term is akin to Biermann et al.’s (2009) concept of a “global
governance architecture”, which they deﬁne as “the overarching
system of public and private institutions that are valid or active in
a given issue area of world politics”.
Confronted with such an alphabet soup, some scholars have
judged that “no single account can do justice to the multiplicity of
rules and institutions that make up the full energy regime
complex” (Colgan et al., 2012). Florini and Sovacool (2009) have
circumvented the issue by listing the “types” of energy governors,
rather than presenting an exhaustive list. Cherp et al. (2011) take
a different approach by listing some actors and organizations
within three GEG arenas: energy security, energy access and
climate change. This links to broader discussions about the
difﬁculty to map regime complexes in general—a nice illustration
is the very different mapping of the climate change regime
complex provided by Keohane and Victor (2011), on the one
hand, and Abbott (2012), on the other.
Key international organizations. A notable number of studies
have been concerned with studying individual institutions and
their role in GEG. The Paris-based IEA, a daughter organiza-
tion of the OECD, has received by far the most attention in this
regard. It is generally regarded as the “world’s foremost mul-
tilateral energy organization” (Van de Graaf, 2015) and “the
closest we have to a World Energy Organization” (Van de
Graaf, 2013a). It should thus not come as a surprise that the
IEA’s evolving role and governance functions has received
ample attention, both in the 1970s and 1980s and in recent
years (Van de Graaf and Lesage, 2009; Colgan, 2009; Leverett,
2010; Kohl, 2010; Van de Graaf, 2012, 2015; Lesage and Van de
Graaf, 2013; Heubaum and Biermann, 2015; Colgan and Van de
Graaf, 2015).
The IEA’s counterpart on the global oil market, OPEC,
has probably received more attention but not in relation to GEG
(for an exception, see Goldthau and Witte, 2011). Most of the
literature on OPEC has tried to model its behaviour as a would-be
commodity cartel, and tried to examine the inﬂuence of the
organization on world oil prices. While this literature is marked
by a lot of disagreement, recent research demonstrates that OPEC
members cheat on their agreed production quotas most of the
time and that the organization does not have the capacity at all to
set world oil prices, although this belief persists as a “rational
myth” (Colgan, 2014).
Box 1 | Selected efforts to map GEG arrangements and institutions
 Suding and Lempp (2007): UN Commission on Sustainable Development (UN-CSD), United Nations Department on Economic
and Social Affairs (UN-DESA), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), IEA, Asia-Paciﬁc Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate (APP), Global Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP), Global Village Energy Project (GVEP), Johannesburg
Renewable Energy Coalition (JREC), Mediterranean Renewable Energy Programme (MEDREP), IEA’s Networks of Expertise in
Energy Technology (NEET), Partnership for Clean Indoor Air (PCIA), Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership
(REEEP), Global Network on Energy for Sustainable Development (GNESD), International Science Panel on Renewable Energies
(ISPRE), European Renewable Energy Council (EREC), International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Society for Solar
Energy (ISES), World Council for Renewable Energy (WCRE), G8
 Kérébel and Keppler (2009): World Energy Council (WEC), OPEC, IEA, IEF, EITI, Jeddah Energy Summit
 Lesage et al. (2010a): World Bank Group, UN-CSD, IAEA, IEF, UNFCCC, IRENA, G8, Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), OPEC,
IEA, Gas-Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), International Partnership for Energy Efﬁciency Cooperation (IPEEC), Asia-
Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC), Organización Latinoamericana de Energía (OLADE), Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),
African Energy Commission (AFREC)
 Sovacool and Florini (2012): UN, Global Environment Facility (GEF), IEA, OLADE, ECT, Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD), International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Generation IV International Forum
(GIF), OPEC, GECF, IEF, International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (IPHE), G8, Summit of the Americas, WEC,
World Council for Renewable Energies (WCRE), Global Energy Network Institute (GENI), Asian Development Bank (ADB),
World Bank Group, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), African Development Bank (AfDB), Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), European Union (EU), Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), Southern African Development Community (SADC), APEC, South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC), Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), REEEP, GNESD, International Network on
Gender and Sustainable Energy (ENERGIA), Appropriate Infrastructure Development Group (AIDG), International Network for
Sustainable Energy (INFORSE), World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD), Collaborative Labelling and
Appliance Standards Programme (CLASP), Efﬁcient Energy for Sustainable Development Partnership (EESD), GVEP,
International Institute for Energy Conservation (IIEC), Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles (PCFV), Clinton Climate
Initiative (CCI), Energy Through Enterprise (E+Co), Global Energy Efﬁciency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF), Small-
Scale Sustainable Infrastructure Development Fund (S3IDF), Solar Electric Light Fund (SELF), Acumen Fund (AF), Global
Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (GACC), Green Climate Fund (GCF)
 Colgan et al. (2012): IAEA, OPEC, OECD, OAPEC, OLADE, IEA, G7, IEF, ECT, IRENA, IPEEC
 Leal-Arcas and Filis (2013): UN, EU/EEA, NAFTA, ASEAN/AFTA, ECC, GECF, G8, G20, IEA, MEF, OPEC, UNFCCC,
WPC, OPEC
 Wilson (2015): OPEC, IEA, ECT, IEF, GECF, APEC, EAS, WTO, G8, G20
 Escribano (2015): EITI, GECF, IAEA, IEA, IEF, IPEEC, JODI, NEA, OAPEC, OPEC, SE4ALL
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Another key institution, sometimes missed by the GEG litera-
ture because of the agency’s orientation towards security issues,
is the IAEA. Set up within the United Nations in 1957, the
IAEA’s objective is to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear
technologies (Lesage et al., 2010a, b). Its programme of work
includes three areas: safeguards and veriﬁcation (to ensure that
activities are not used for military purposes); safety and security
(to protect people and the environment from radiation); and
science and technology (to mobilize peaceful applications of
nuclear technology). The role of civilian nuclear energy in
international security questions has recently attracted scholarly
attention (Fuhrmann, 2012; Brown and Kaplow, 2014).
Other international institutions that have received some
attention in the literature on GEG include the G8 and G20
(Lesage et al., 2009, 2010a; Van de Graaf and Westphal, 2011;
Downie, 2015a), IRENA (Van de Graaf, 2013a, b; Urpelainen and
Van de Graaf, 2013), the UN (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2010), the
International Energy Forum (IEF) (Fattouh and van der Linde,
2011), the International Partnership for Energy Efﬁciency
Cooperation (IPEEC) (Lesage et al., 2010b), the Energy Charter
Treaty (ECT) (Konoplyanik and Walde, 2006; Aalto, 2016), the
Energy Community Treaty (Renner, 2009), various multilateral
development banks (Nakhooda, 2011; Kim and Urpelainen, 2013)
and international ﬁnancial institutions (Newell, 2011), among
others. Last but not least, the EU has an explicitly regional energy
governance approach (based on liberalization), which it also tries
to export to non-EU countries and to the global stage (Goldthau
and Sitter, 2015).
Private actors and transnational governance. Beyond studying
international energy organizations created by states, scholars have
also turned their attention to the roles played by non-state actors
such as business, civil society and science organizations in GEG.
These non-state actors sometimes participate in intergovern-
mental processes. The December 2015 climate conference in
Paris, for instance, was attended by a large number of civil society
and business groups, who all tried to inﬂuence the negotiation
process. Yet, non-state actors have also established networks
whose deﬁning characteristic is independent of state approval or
support. Where such networks become institutionalized and
begin to set broader norms and rules, they become transnational
governance networks in their own right (Biermann and Pattberg,
2012; Green, 2013).
Such transnational governance networks come in various
forms. Some are structured as “public–private partnerships”,
bringing together corporations, societal groups and governments
around global policy objectives. A case in point is the REEEP,
a multi-stakeholder platform to pursue cooperation in the area
of renewable energy and energy efﬁciency. Another instance of
transnational governance are “private regimes”, which involve
non-state actors willing to commit to self-regulatory norms,
standards and certiﬁcation schemes in a given issue area. The
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which aims
to tackle corruption and graft in the upstream oil and gas sectors
by facilitating voluntary disclosing of payments, is a case in
point (Hauﬂer, 2010). The EITI is part of a broader wave of
information-based governance schemes in global energy and
climate governance (Florini and Saleem, 2011).
Given the enormous diversity in such transnational governance
networks, it need not come as a surprise that there is equally
much divergence in the effectiveness of such networks. Szulecki
et al. (2011) found that, so far, the majority of private–public
energy partnerships have not been fulﬁlling the high expecta-
tions placed on their effectiveness. Nevertheless, research by
de Coninck et al. (2008) has concluded that international
technology-oriented agreements to address climate change can
be effective, especially if they set standards and mandates for
speciﬁc sectors, not for speciﬁc technologies.
A minority of scholars has focused not on institutions or on
transnational networks, but on less tangible aspects of GEG such
as norms (for example, Gillies, 2010) and corporate elite ties in
global energy (de Graaff, 2012).
Domestic–international interactions. The description provided
in this section focuses on international organizations and net-
works, but GEG is formed by an interaction between inter-
national, national and subnational actors. The interactions
between the actors are complex and characterized by multiple
points of contact. For instance, the IEA works with its member states
to improve good governance and share best practices of energy
policies. In practice, this means that the IEA interacts with multiple
branches of the national governance. In the United States, the IEA
frequently works with the Department of Energy, Congress and
various House and Senate committees, the Federal Energy Reg-
ulatory Commission and the State Department. Further, the activity
and inﬂuence of the international actors depends signiﬁcantly on the
issue at hand. International organizations often have only an indirect
inﬂuence on issues that lie ﬁrmly within national jurisdictions, such
as electrical grid infrastructure or taxation policy. Many questions
about the nature and efﬁcacy of the international–national interfaces
of energy governance remain unanswered.
Evaluating GEG
Over time, GEG scholars have moved beyond purely mapping the
global energy architecture to an evaluation and interpretation of
it. Many argue that the current global energy architecture needs
reform, but the reasons for and substance of that reform is subject
to more controversy. Some have proposed to create an entirely
new Global Energy Agency (ElBaradei, 2008; Akinola, 2013),
although a large majority of authors has strongly advised against
it, deeming it both undesirable and unfeasible. In the words of
Lesage et al. (2010a: 7–8): “How could the General Assembly
arrive at a timely and substantial agreement, when we take into
account its bureaucratic habits, the enormous diversity in
preferences, the risk of free-riding behavior and, last but not
least, the distrust of a lot of capitals vis-à-vis the UN for dealing
with delicate and strategic issues like energy?”.
In this section, we make two assessments of the global energy
architecture. One is a functional gap analysis, based on the ﬁve
overarching goals of GEG identiﬁed earlier. The other is an
analysis of the legitimacy-efﬁcacy trade-off in GEG. Here we thus
move beyond a mere review of the existing GEG literature to add
a perspective that has, in our view, been largely missing from the
existing debates: What are the benchmarks against which one can
assess the performance and pathologies of current efforts to
govern energy?
Gap analysis of the regime complex for energy. Historically, the
regime complex for energy has grown for multiple reasons
(Colgan et al., 2012). Some institutions were created as a response
to energy crises, such as the creation of the IEA in 1974 in the
aftermath of the Arab oil embargo. Other institutions, such as the
IEF, were created out of a desire to bridge multiple worldviews
and different understandings of the global energy market.5 As the
regime complex grows, it is worth considering the extent to which
the current regime complex addresses the potential scope of GEG.
Figure 3 provides a rough mapping of the activities of some of
the largest institutions within the regime complex for energy. The
activities are mapped against the ﬁve objectives identiﬁed earlier.
Three caveats are in order: ﬁrst, the ﬁgure says nothing about the
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efﬁcacy of those activities. For instance, the IEA, IRENA and
the World Bank are all working on the issue of climate change,
but there are real questions about the efﬁcacy of those activities.
Second, the ﬁgure captures only the major foci of the institutions’
activities. Third, there is considerable heterogeneity in the
activities associated with each objective. For instance, while the
IEA and EITI both work on domestic good governance, the IEA
works primarily to assist developed countries to craft more
rational economic policies (for example, electrical-grid best
practices), whereas EITI focuses on the transparency of resource
rents in energy-exporting countries in the developing world.
As Fig. 3 suggests, clearly there are gaps between the potential
and actual scope of GEG. Some objectives, like energy security,
receive a great deal of institutional attention. Fewer organizations
are focused on other objectives, such as international security or
domestic good governance. Moreover, institutions have quite
different concerns within the broad objectives. For instance, while
the IEA is concerned about the supply of oil and energy, OPEC is
focused on security of demand, and IRENA is focused on
alternatives to the oil market altogether. Another example lies in
economic development: while the IEA is concerned about
macroeconomic impacts of energy for the OECD states, the
World Bank and other multilateral development banks aim to
reduce energy poverty in the developing countries.
Table 2 highlights a key governance gap associated with each of
the ﬁve objectives. With regard to energy security, international
dispute resolution has become a major concern for many states,
whether they are exporting, importing or transit countries. The
need for dispute resolution is perhaps most vividly demonstrated
in the conﬂicts between Russia and the Ukraine over natural gas
transit services, or between Exxon and Venezuela over alleged
asset expropriation. For economic development, the issue of
energy poverty is enormous: currently 1.3 billion people lack
access to electricity and 2.6 billion people lack access to modern
fuels for cooking and heating.6 Environmentally, the regime
complex for energy is attempting to provide responses to global
climate change, but much more substantial action is needed.
There are two areas where the gap between the actual and
potential scope of GEG is especially noticeable. The ﬁrst is the
link between oil and international security. There is now a
considerable body of academic literature that argues that oil has a
causal effect on the incidence of civil wars in oil-producing
countries (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoefﬂer, 2004;
LeBillon, 2005; Ross, 2012; Barma, 2014; Colgan, 2015).7 More
recent research indicates that oil is also causally linked to
international conﬂicts, particularly when oil income is available to
revolutionary governments in countries like Libya, Iran, Iraq and
Venezuela (Colgan, 2010; Colgan, 2013a, b). Petrostates were
involved in 22% of all militarized interstate disputes since 1970,
even though they are just 31 states and a small fraction of the
world’s population. Overall, scholarly work suggests that the
international trade of oil injects vast amounts of money into
political systems that are ill-suited to receive it, with signiﬁcant
consequences for the centralization of political power and the
build-up of military capability in oil-exporting states. These facts
raise a host of political, economic and moral questions about the
world’s continued dependence on petroleum as a primary source
of energy in advanced economies. Indeed, given that oil income
plays a causal role in international and civil wars, policymakers
may ﬁnd it desirable to minimize the ﬂow of such income into
under-institutionalized states, or to limit their access to
international arms markets. Yet at present the regime complex
for energy has no real institutional capacity for addressing these
issues.
The second critical gap in the regime complex is in the
protection of human rights in the developing world. While a
number of institutions, such as the World Bank, at least discuss
this topic, human rights issues are characterized by a lack of
governance. This is perhaps most evident in Nigeria, Angola,
Sudan and other African nations where foreign multinational oil
companies operate to extract oil for export sales. Shell Oil, for
example, suffered widespread condemnation for its alleged
connection to Nigerian troops who committed serious abuses in
the course of protecting Shell personnel and equipment.
International condemnation of Shell exploded in 1995, when
Nigeria executed the noted author Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight
Ogoni colleagues who had been campaigning against the
devastation of the Niger Delta (Frynas, 2003). Despite the bad
press and occasional calls for more rigorous governance, the oil
industry has not seen an analogue to the Kimberley Process, a
certiﬁcation scheme to prevent “blood diamonds”—rough
diamonds used by rebel movements to ﬁnance wars—to enter
international trade.8 There exists no parallel certiﬁcation scheme
with respect to “blood oil” (Weinar, 2016), an omission that is
painfully relevant in light of the large oil revenues generated by
Islamic State in Syria.9
Legitimacy and efﬁcacy in the energy regime complex. The
relationship between legitimacy and efﬁcacy provides another
lens that can be helpful in assessing the regime complex for
energy. Efﬁcacy refers to the extent to which an institution
achieves the desired outcomes associated with its activities, and
the extent to which those outcomes match the larger objectives.
Legitimacy is more complicated, and can be conceptualized in
multiple ways. Two paired deﬁnitions of legitimacy are especially
useful: sociological versus normative legitimacy, and input versus
output legitimacy. An institution is sociologically legitimate when
it is accepted as appropriate, and worthy of being obeyed, by
relevant audiences. An institution is normatively legitimate when
its practices meet a set of standards that have been stated and
defended, such as treating like cases alike (Buchanan and
Keohane, 2006). An institution has input legitimacy on the
basis of the actors that participated in the decision and the pro-
cess used to create outcomes. An institution has output legitimacy
based on effective problem-solving and the quality of its policy
outcomes (Risse, 2004).
Table 2 | Key gaps in GEG
Objective Key gap in governance
Energy security Dispute resolution, especially for energy
transit issues
Economic development Energy poverty in developing countries
International security Conﬂicts and arms purchases from
petrodollars
Environment Developing meaningful responses to climate
change
Good governance No real buy-in for EITI-like principles of
transparency, human rights
Figure 3 | Mapping institutional activities of GEG.
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The development of the regime complex for energy is affected
by the interaction between legitimacy and efﬁcacy. An ideal
regime complex would be constituted by institutions that were
both legitimate and efﬁcacious. Under some conditions, these
qualities are partially conditional on each other: an institution can
be made more efﬁcacious by making it more legitimate, and vice
versa. For example, one of the core missions of the IEA is to
manage the risk of energy supply crises, especially oil price
shocks. However, the IEA’s efﬁcaciousness in this task depends
signiﬁcantly on its market power and its ability to move global oil
markets through coordinated releases from member states’
strategic petroleum reserves (Colgan, 2009). As the global
marketplace has changed, the role of energy importers outside
of the IEA such as China and India has dramatically increased in
importance. Yet China and India are reluctant to become
members of the IEA, in part because they do not perceive the
IEA as legitimate: they see it instead as a club for rich countries
(Van de Graaf, 2015; Downie, 2015b). Thus the efﬁcacy of the
IEA is shaped by its perceived input and sociological legitimacy.
Strategies for improving the efﬁcacy and legitimacy of
international institutions will depend on the particular circum-
stances of the institution. To illustrate this point, Fig. 4 highlights
two possible paths that an institution might take in improving its
efﬁcacy. One route (Path A) is to change the rules, functional
tasks and capabilities of the institution itself to alter the range of
outcomes the institution can achieve. As a consequence of this
increase in efﬁcacy, the institution could be perceived as more
legitimate by relevant audiences (an example of output
legitimacy), which in turn could increase the beneﬁts of
membership. An alternative route (Path B) is to ﬁrst focus on
the membership and input legitimacy of the institution, which
could thereby increase its functional capability and thus efﬁcacy.
There is unlikely to be a single best path for all institutions at all
times, and questions remain about the conditions under which
one path is chosen rather than another.
Conclusions and outlook
The state of GEG. This article has reviewed the existing literature
on GEG and added a critical assessment of the global energy
regime complex, based on a functional gap analysis, on the one
hand, and the relationship between efﬁcacy and legitimacy, on
the other.
Three broad lessons emerge from the analysis. The ﬁrst is the
most basic point of this article: there are signiﬁcant gaps between
the potential and actual scope of GEG. Even though there is no
shortage of international institutions, forums and networks that
address various aspects of GEG (see Box 1), these governance
arrangements fall way short in addressing major energy-related
externalities and delivering the overarching goals of GEG
(as identiﬁed in Table 1).
The second lesson is that the “core” of the regime complex
depends signiﬁcantly on which objective(s) are at issue. Suppose
the regime complex is pictured as institutions that lie within
concentric circles, with some institutions closer to the core than
others. If one focuses primarily on the objective of energy
security, institutions such as OPEC and the IEA lie at the core of
the regime complex. If instead one focuses on the environmental
or development impact of energy, institutions like IRENA and the
UNFCCC or the World Bank become far more central. As
such, there is no single core to the complex; instead, there are
multiple cores around which organizations cluster based on their
objectives and activities.
The third lesson is that while some of these gaps exist simply
due to inaction or an absence of political will, many of these gaps
exist because of genuine differences in the national interests
of different types of states. Table 3 suggests some of the key
cleavages between different types of states, depending on the
objective selected.10 For example, on the issue of energy security,
producers are understandably concerned about the security of
demand and ensuring a proﬁtable rate of return on their
investments, while suppliers focus on the security of supply for
as a basic input to an advanced industrial economy. In the area of
economic development, the primary concerns of developed states
(for example, macroeconomic stability) are likely to be different
from those of developing states (for example, energy poverty).
Some of these differences are a matter of the priority of objectives;
in other cases, there are real differences in states’ preferences for
outcomes (for example, high or low oil prices). These differences
in state interests can and do limit international cooperation.
Policymakers seeking to design institutions are likely to be
successful to the extent that they respect the differences in state
interests, and work within the areas where state interests overlap.
What Table 3 does not do, however, is offer a comprehensive
analysis of how governance mechanisms emerge, or how and
why gaps appear within the regime complex. One can expect that
states construct international regimes on the basis of their
interests, which in turn reﬂect the interests of the major
constituencies that exert inﬂuence over state leaders (Keohane,
1989). This observation opens at least two kinds of research
questions. First: who, how and under what conditions are
subnational actors able to inﬂuence state preferences for GEG?
Second: given a particular issue area, who, how and under what
conditions do states and other international actors design
institutions for GEG? Identifying the causes and consequences
of governance gaps is a major research challenge.
Recent trends and innovations in GEG. Beyond the three energy
transitions identiﬁed above, the energy sector is continuously
upended by rapid changes, including innovations at the multi-
lateral level. At their 2014 meeting in Brisbane, for example, the
G20 leaders agreed on a set of Principles on Energy Collabora-
tion, in which they recognized that “the international energy
architecture needs to reﬂect better the changing realities of the
world energy landscape” (G20, 2014). In June 2015, the leaders of
Figure 4 | Interaction between legitimacy and efﬁcacy.
Table 3 | Key cleavages for objectives of GEG
Objective Key cleavages
Energy security Exporting, importing and transit states
Economic development Developed and developing states
International security Varies
Environment Developed and developing states
Good governance Oil corporations, producer states and
international civil society
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the G7, for the ﬁrst time, pledged to fully decarbonize their
economies by the end of this century. In September 2015, the
United Nations adopted a set of Sustainable Development Goals,
which include a speciﬁc goal to “ensure access to affordable,
reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all” by 2030 (see Box 2).
And, in the run-up to the COP21 climate conference in Paris, in
December 2015, more than 160 countries submitted national
plans on how they intend to contribute to the goals of the climate
change convention in the post-2020 period.
Important changes are also afoot in the area of energy trade
and investment governance. In an effort to revive the ECT, much
in disarray after Russia’s withdrawal in 2009, no less than
64 states (including China) signed a new International Energy
Charter in May 2015 (Aalto, 2016), though its actual effectiveness
remains to be seen. In July 2014, 14 WTO members (including
the United States, EU, China and Japan) launched plurilateral
negotiations for an Environmental Goods Agreement with an aim
to reduce trade barriers for goods such as wind turbines and solar
panels, most relevant in an era of growing green energy trade
conﬂicts (Lewis, 2014). The recently concluded trade agree-
ment between the United States and some Paciﬁc Rim countries
(Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership), as well as the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership, still under negotiation, could have
important consequences on the energy front. The Chinese-
sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank could also
become an important component of the energy regime complex.
Of course, GEG is not the exclusive terrain of multilateral
agreements and institutions. National regulations can sometimes
reverberate globally. Such is the case with the recent US rules
(Dodd-Frank Act from 2010) and EU rules (Transparency
Directive from 2013) requiring mandatory disclosure of payments
made by companies engaged in the oil, gas, mining and logging
sectors. These rules are supposed to complement the (voluntary)
EITI. Given that they are issued by the EU and the United States,
they are set to become the global standard. Domestic and
international courts are also an oft-overlooked player in global
energy politics. In March 2015, for instance, the International
Court of Justice upheld a prior ruling by an Ecuadorian court that
ﬁned the US oil company Chevron US$9.5 billion in 2011 for
polluting parts of the Amazon. In a landmark ruling in June 2015,
a domestic court in The Hague ordered the Dutch government to
cut carbon emission to protect its citizens from climate change.
These changes take place against the background of rapidly
evolving energy markets and technologies. The shale revolution,
the Fukushima nuclear accident, the continuing decline in the
cost of renewables and growing calls to divest from fossil fuels,
which may become “stranded assets” in a carbon-constrained
world, are all trends that have the potential to dramatically
change the face of global energy markets. Geopolitical events such
as the Ukraine crisis (and the ensuing energy sanctions against
Russia), the continued unrest in the Middle East (Yemen, Syria
and so on) or the build-up of tensions in the South China Sea
are often linked to energy and contribute to the securitization
of energy issues—thereby also impinging on the agenda and
purposes of GEG.
The evolving research agenda. Given that these shifts and
transitions are already under way, and that the gaps between the
actual and potential scope of GEG are likely to persist in the
future, current policymakers might consider the ways in which
institutions can be created or extended to address contemporary
issues. The purpose of this concluding section is not to provide a
set of policy recommendations (for example, Hirst and Froggatt,
2012), but rather to highlight a variety of research questions for
further exploration. While the research agenda of GEG is vast and
continues to expand, we focus here on three areas where we see
much promise in pursuing further research.
A ﬁrst set of questions relates to the nature and impact of GEG
beyond multilateral organizations. Many if not most studies of
GEG have focused on the formal, interstate forms of energy
cooperation and speciﬁc multilateral organizations (for example,
Colgan et al., 2012; Leal-Arcas et al., 2015). Only a handful of
scholars have moved to examine informal norms and practices in
GEG (for example, Gillies, 2010; Florini and Saleem, 2011; Colgan
and Van de Graaf, 2015). Even fewer scholars have ventured to
examine the role of transnational or subnational players in GEG.
The latter point is especially important with regard to issues such
as mitigating the resource curse or expanding energy access in the
global South, issues that exhibit both local and global facets
(Carbonnier, 2011; Bazilian et al., 2014).
A second set of questions relates to the interplay between
energy governance and related areas, in particular climate change
(Fouquet, 2013; Heubaum and Biermann, 2015), water (Hussey
and Pittock, 2012) and food security (Hendrix and Salehyan,
2012). The notion of a “resource nexus” captures the idea that
these areas are all closely interconnected. Yet, in practice, scholars
and practitioners still tend to depart from policy silos and fail to
grasp the interactions between some of these sectors, and their
governance implications (Florini and Sovacool, 2011). Looking
beyond the conﬁnes of the energy policy silo, the trade-offs
become much more complex than the traditional energy policy
triangle of balancing energy security, energy access and climate
mitigation (Gunningham, 2012). There is much to be learned
from closer studies of the interactions between climate mitigation
policies and fossil fuel markets (for example, van Asselt, 2014;
Van de Graaf and Verbruggen, 2015), between biofuels and food
security governance (Lima and Gupta, 2013) or between energy
and water security.
A third promising area for further enquiry is to analyse global
energy politics from the perspective of International Political
Economy (IPE). The literature on energy politics is split between
realist, geopolitical accounts about “energy security”, on the
one hand, and liberal, institutionalist accounts of “energy
governance”, on the other. By its focus on the interplay between
states and markets at the international level, IPE has much to
offer to study the rapidly changing world of energy. Yet,
strikingly, energy has largely been ignored by IPE scholars and
does not feature in the canonical textbooks. Recently, some
scholars have launched a call to develop a genuine “IPE of
Box 2 | Targets under the seventh Sustainable Development Goal
7.1
By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern
energy services
7.2
By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the
global energy mix
7.3
By 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efﬁciency
7.a
By 2030, enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to
clean energy research and technology, including renewable energy,
energy efﬁciency and advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology,
and promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy
technology
7.b
By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying
modern and sustainable energy services for all in developing countries,
in particular least developed countries, small island developing States
and land-locked developing countries, in accordance with their
respective programmes of support
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energy” ﬁeld of study (Kuzemko et al., 2012; Hancock and
Vivoda, 2014; Van de Graaf et al., 2016).
Clearly, the research agenda for GEG includes a variety of
issues that are both substantively important and theoretically
challenging.
Notes
1 For information on this research project, see: http://old.gppi.net/focus_areas/global_
energy_governance/.
2 For information on this research project, see: http://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/research/
s-t-lee-project-on-global-governance.
3 It should be noted that these transitions do not exist in isolation but are closely
intertwined. Rising energy demand from China, India and other emerging countries
(which reﬂects rising living standards in those countries) has accelerated GHG
emissions and energy security concerns.
4 This question paraphrases work by Avant et al. (2010): Who Governs the Globe?
5 It is noteworthy that the original supporters of the IEF, such as France, Venezuela
and Norway, viewed the global market for energy as a potentially positive-sum game
in which joint gains from cooperation were possible. Other countries, most notably
the United States, were much more sceptical of this view, and historically tended to
view the interaction between OPEC and the IEA as a zero-sum conﬂict.
6 IEA Website, http://www.iea.org/topics/energypoverty/ (visited September 2015).
7 The issue is debated, however: see, for example, Smith (2004).
8 In 2000, the United Kingdom and the United States initiated the Voluntary Principles
on Security and Human Rights, a set of principles designed to guide companies in the
extractive and energy sectors with respect to maintaining the safety and security of
their operations while respecting human rights (see http://www.voluntaryprinciples.
org). According to informed observers, however, the “Voluntary Principles appear to
have faded into inactivity without ever developing a real institutional structure”
(Rose, 2015: 141).
9 There is of course the EITI, which we mentioned above and which was modelled to
some extent after the Kimberley Process. Yet, the EITI is geared to tackle corruption
and graft by developing a voluntary standard for disclosing payments in the
extractive industries. It does not directly address human rights concerns.
10 We use the term cleavages to indicate policy areas of political contention.
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